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Abstract
A dynamic model of collective consumption and saving decisions made by a finite
number of agents with constant but different discount rates is developed. Collective
utility is a weighted sum of individual utilities with time-varying utility weights. Under
standard separability assumptions, it is shown that collective preferences may be non-
stationary but still satisfy time consistency. The assumption of time-varying weights
is key to balance the need of the group for a changing distribution of consumption
among its members over time with their tolerance for consumption fluctuations.
Key words: Dynamic collective choice; Time consistency; Recursive preferences;
Pareto optimality
JEL classification: D71, D90, D61, C61
1 Introduction
This paper develops a framework for constructing collective preferences from the Pareto
optimal consumption and saving decisions of time consistent individuals with heteroge-
neous discount factors. One of the main issues addressed in this framework is whether the
aggregation of heterogeneous time preferences necessarily implies time inconsistency. This
aggregation problem has been long recognized, but it still poses challenges to researchers.
For instance, Dumas (1989) shows that difficulties in modelling aggregate behavior in the
presence of heterogeneity may even arise in a two-agent setting with homogeneous dis-
count factors. A more general approach has been taken by Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005)
in the analysis of a pure exchange economy composed of a finite group of agents with
different discount factors. They show that Paretian aggregation of individual preferences
does not generally yield a constant aggregate discount rate. In fact, optimality implies
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that the individual shares of a common consumption stream change over time, which al-
lows to define an aggregate discount rate. Collective impatience is a weighted average of
individual discount rates, with weights that are proportional to the agents’ tolerance for
consumption fluctuations (a concept similar to risk tolerance when agents have preferences
over stochastic consumption streams).
The conditions for time consistent aggregation of individual preferences are very strong,
as shown by Zuber (2011). Aggregate preferences are stationary and Pareto optimal if
and only if individual and collective preferences are additively separable with exponential
discounting, and all agents have the same discount rate. There are strong implications for
models of collective choice as well. For instance, Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015) show that
when preferences of heterogeneous agents evaluating a stream of common consumption
are aggregated via a collective utility function that satisfies Pareto optimality, collective
preferences must be dictatorial or time inconsistent. On the other hand, if aggregation
rules are Paretian and nondictatorial, they exhibit a specific form of time inconsistency,
known as present-bias or decreasing impatience.
As is common in social choice theory, previous results are based on a fundamental
assumption: aggregate utility is a weighted sum of individual utilities with weights that are
constant over time. This paper shows that relaxing this assumption makes time consistent
aggregation of individuals with heterogeneous discount factors possible. To do this, the
problem of constructing Pareto optimal allocations is extended to allow for time-varying
weights, based on the framework developed by Lucas and Stokey (1984). Utility weights
then become a state variable in the dynamic program. Important extensions introduced by
Dana and Le Van (1990, 1991), such as allowing for unbounded returns and more general
specifications of the discounting process, are also included in the analysis.
A sharp insight provided by Halevy (2015) will also be used to characterize the collec-
tive preferences obtained in this work. Specifically, assume that preferences are represented
by a sequence of preference relations {%t}
∞
t=0 defined over temporal payments (c, t), where
c is a real number and t represents time. For every t, t′ ≥ 0, b, c ∈ R, and τ, τ ′ ≥ 0, three
distinct properties are defined as follows:
(H1) Stationarity: (b, t+ τ) ∼t (c, t + τ
′) ⇐⇒ (b, t′ + τ) ∼t (c, t
′ + τ ′),
(H2) Time invariance: (b, t+ τ) ∼t (c, t+ τ
′) ⇐⇒ (b, t′ + τ) ∼t′ (c, t
′ + τ ′),
(H3) Time consistency: (b, t+ τ) ∼t (c, t+ τ
′) ⇐⇒ (b, t+ τ) ∼t′ (c, t + τ
′).
It is shown in Halevy (2015) that any two properties imply the third. Therefore, if pref-
erences are time invariant, they satisfy time consistency if and only if they are stationary.
But the distinction between stationarity and time consistency as two separate phenomena
has been often overlooked in the literature.
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Based on this fundamental distinction between time consistency, time invariance, and
stationarity, Millner and Heal (2018) have recently shown that time-additive collective
preferences can be both nondictatorial and time consistent. If agents have heterogeneous
discount factors and utility weights are a function of time, they find a specific rule that
utility weights must obey for collective preferences to be time consistent. In the present
paper, we show that time consistency is not only possible in a dynamic economy with
consumption and savings, but also that the specified functional form for the utility weights
can be the outcome of agents’ optimizing behavior and Pareto efficient sharing rules.
To work with an axiomatic approach and develop conditions for consistent aggregation,
it is necessary to impose certain separation properties on collective preferences. In this
respect, the close relation between the concepts of risk tolerance and tolerance for consump-
tion fluctuations is clearly beneficial. The classical results from optimal risk sharing and
syndicate theory in a static equilibrium by Wilson (1968) and Amershi and Stoeckenius
(1983) are used to formulate aggregate utility as the product of two factors: a discounting
function depending only on time and the utility derived from current consumption. Along
these lines, related aggregation results in pure exchange Arrow-Debreu economies have
been obtained by Schmedders (2007), assuming risk aversion and complete markets, and
Wakai (2007), under homogeneous ambiguity. They show that if individual utility func-
tions satisfy the property of linear risk tolerance with identical marginal risk tolerance, a
two-fund separation property holds for these economies.
A similar approach as the one presented here to determine efficient intertemporal
allocations in a multi-agent setting has been used in Dumas et al. (2000). They assume a
stochastic endowment economy in continuous-time. Although their work does not touch
on the issue of time consistency, an interesting aspect is that individuals have recursive
utilities that are not time-additive, allowing to distinguish risk aversion from intertemporal
substitution. They also obtain an aggregation result for the case that each agent has
Kreps-Porteus preferences with identical risk aversion.
The recent literature in time preferences and intertemporal choice is too extensive
to be reviewed here in any detail.1 Besides the studies that have already been cited,
recent works more closely related to this paper include Banerjee and Mitra (2007) and
Banerjee and Dubey (2013) on impatience as a general property of Paretian social wel-
fare functions. Relations between stationarity, decreasing impatience, and time consis-
tency have been studied by Prelec (2004), Bleichrodt et al. (2009), and Rohde (2009).
Characterization and welfare properties of competitive equilibria with time-dependent
preferences are given in Herings and Rohde (2006), Luttmer and Mariotti (2006), and
1See the comprehensive survey by Frederick et al. (2002) and references therein. A detailed historical
account can also be found in the work of Palacios-Huerta (2003).
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Dziewulski (2015).2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the model and
provides the main result for aggregation. Section 3 gives a characterization of collective
preferences and optimal sharing rules. Additional properties are discussed in Section 4,
where the result on time consistent aggregation is proved. Concluding remarks are offered
in Section 5. Technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Setup and Aggregation
2.1 Preliminaries
Let R denote the set of real numbers. Then, R+ := [0,+∞) and R := R∪ {−∞}. The set
of all nonnegative integers is represented by Z+. Vectors in the n-dimensional Euclidean
space Rn+ are denoted by x. For infinite sequences of these vectors, the notation used is
x := (x0, x1, . . .). The space of real-valued sequences ℓ
∞ is endowed with the sup norm,
‖x‖∞ := supt |xt|. If n > 1 and each component is in ℓ
∞, the corresponding product space
will be denoted as (ℓ∞)n (for ease of notation, the infinity superscript will be dropped if
no ambiguity arises).
The following conventions, which are commonly used in convex optimization problems,
are also adopted:
(C1) 0 · (±∞) = (±∞) · 0 = 0;
(C2) a · (±∞) = (±∞) · a = ±∞, for all a ∈ (0,+∞];
(C3) a · (±∞) = (±∞) · a = ∓∞, for all a ∈ [−∞, 0).
2.2 The model
For some integer n ≥ 2, a set N = {1, . . . , n} of infinitely lived agents make collective
consumption and saving decisions. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . There
is a single consumption good which can either be consumed or transformed one-to-one
into capital available next period. Production occurs in a single unit where agents pool
their capital holdings to obtain a certain deterministic return in terms of the consumption
good, which is called “consumption” for simplicity. But the framework is quite general
and admits various interpretations.
Time preferences are represented by an additively separable intertemporal utility func-
tion with instantaneous utility u, and constant geometric discounting. Instantaneous util-
2Other recent contributions on related topics include: Drugeon (2000), Das (2003), Hayashi
(2003), Benoˆıt and Ok (2007), Ok and Masatlioglu (2007), Mutlu (2013), de Paz et al. (2013), and
Montiel-Olea and Strzalecki (2014).
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ity is assumed to be common to all agents, but discount factors δi are heterogeneous and
satisfy
1 > δ1 > δ2 ≥ · · · ≥ δn > 0,
so there are at least two separate groups of agents in terms of their impatience.
Denote by xit ∈ R+ the quantity which agent i consumes at date t. Let x
i = (xi0, x
i
1, . . .)
denote an infinite sequence of consumptions for agent i. Each agent i assigns an utility
value to a consumption path xi in the space ℓ+ of non-negative bounded sequences
wi0(x
i) :=
∞∑
t=0
(δi)tui(x
i
t), i = 1, . . . , n.
The following assumptions on the primitives of the problem, preferences and technology,
will be used throughout the paper.
(U1) For each i ∈ N , the instantaneous utility function ui : R+→ R is continuous, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave. At the origin, either ui(0) = 0 or ui(0) = −∞.
(U2) For each i ∈ N , the instantaneous utility function ui is twice continuously differen-
tiable on R+\{0}. If ui(0) = 0, then limx→0+ u
′
i(x) = +∞.
Technology is given by a standard neoclassical production function that transforms aggre-
gate capital into output.
(T1) The production function f : R+ → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and f(0) = 0.
(T2) The production function f is differentiable on R+\{0}, limk→0+ f
′(k) > (1/δn), and
limk→+∞ f
′(k) = 0.
Note that (T1)–(T2) imply the existence of a maximum level of sustainable capital
km > 0, so there is no loss of generality in restricting the state space to the closed interval
K := [0, km]. This implies that the set of feasible consumption (and utilities) is bounded
above. Moreover, (U2)–(T2) guarantee that equilibrium paths are interior.
Definition 2.1. For each t, an allocation is a pair (xt, kt+1), consisting on a consumption
profile xt := (x
1
t , . . . , x
n
t ) ∈ R
n
+ and aggregate capital for the next period kt+1 ∈ K. Given
k0 ≥ 0, a capital path k := (k0, k1, . . .) is said to be feasible if each element of the sequence
belongs to the set
Γ(kt) := {kt+1 ∈ K : 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt)},
which will be called the feasible correspondence at time t.
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Definition 2.2. The set of all feasible capital paths from k0 is defined as
Π(k0) := {k ∈ ℓ+ : kt+1 ∈ Γ(kt), t = 0, 1, . . . ; k0 given} .
Definition 2.3. Let x := (x0, x1, . . .) denote a consumption path. The set of all feasible
consumption paths from k0 is defined as
Ω(k0) :=
{
x ∈ ℓn+ : 0 ≤
∑
i x
i
t ≤ f(kt)−kt+1, t = 0, 1, . . . ; for some k ∈ Π(k0)
}
.
2.3 Optimal allocations with heterogeneous discounting
The methodology for constructing Pareto optimal allocations is mainly based on the works
of Lucas and Stokey (1984) and Dana and Le Van (1990, 1991). Although an important
difference is that individual preferences in the current framework are a primitive of the
problem, instead of being derived from a time aggregator.
A fundamental assumption in this setup is that the Pareto or utility weights for each
agent are allowed to vary over time. For each period t, the set of weights is given by a
vector θt := (θ
1
t , . . . , θ
n
t ) in the n-dimensional simplex, denoted by Θ
n and defined as
(2.1) Θn :=
{
θ ∈ Rn+ : θ
i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n; and
∑
i θ
i = 1
}
.
The utility possibility set U(k) contains all the possible combinations of utility available
to the n agents when the initial capital stock is k ≥ 0,
U(k) :=
{
z ∈ Rn : zi = wi(xi), i = 1, . . . , n, for some x ∈ Ω(k)
}
.
And the value function of the Pareto problem is defined as the support function of the
utility possibility set, that is,
V (k, θ) := sup
z∈U(k)
n∑
i=1
θizi.
A characterization of the value function is given in the following proposition. For de-
tailed proofs, see Lucas and Stokey (1984, Theorem 3) and Section 4 in Dana and Le Van
(1990). Also, Dura´n and Le Van (2000) contains results that are particularly useful for
the case where returns are unbounded.
Proposition 2.4. The value function V : K ×Θn → R satisfies the following properties:
(a) V is continuous on K×Θn;
(b) For each θ ∈ Θn, V (·, θ) : K → R is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
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(c) For each k ∈ K, V (k, ·) : Θn → R is homogeneous of degree one and strictly convex;
(d) V is continuously differentiable in the interior of K×Θn.
The next result, which completely characterizes Pareto optimal allocations, summa-
rizes Propositions 3.1–3.2 and Theorem 3.1 in Dana and Le Van (1990), and is stated
below for convenience.
Proposition 2.5. Under assumptions (U1)–(U2) on preferences and (T1)–(T2) on tech-
nology, a feasible consumption path x ∈ Ω(k0) is Pareto optimal if and only if there exist
sequences k and z such that kt+1 ∈ Γ(kt) and zt ∈ U˜(kt) for all t, where U˜ is the frontier
of U , and zit = ui(x
i
t) + δ
izit+1 for all i ∈ N and for all t. Moreover, k and z are uniquely
determined.3
In light of the above, the problem of finding optimal allocations can be formulated as
follows. For each (k, θ) in K × Θn, a nonnegative consumption profile x := (x1, . . . , xn),
next-period capital y, continuation utilities z, and next-period Pareto weights τ are chosen
to solve the following program:
sup
x∈X, y≥0, z∈U
inf
τ∈Θn
n∑
i=1
θi
[
ui(x
i) + δizi
]
,(PP)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi + y ≤ f(k),
n∑
i=1
τ izi − V (y, τ) ≤ 0.
In what follows, the following notation for aggregate variables is adopted:
xˆ :=
n∑
i=1
xi, xˆt :=
n∑
i=1
xit, and xˆ :=
n∑
i=1
xi,
with Xˆ ⊂ R+ denoting the space of feasible aggregate consumption levels. It is also
convenient to define the set of all feasible aggregate consumption paths from k0, separately
from Ω, which is denoted as Ψ(k0) and defined by
Ψ(k0) := {xˆ ∈ ℓ+ : 0 ≤ xˆt ≤ f(kt)− kt+1, t = 0, 1, . . . ; for some k ∈ Π(k0)} .
Based on the formulation given in (PP), the following theorem lays the foundations
for the preference aggregation process and subsequent results. The proof can be found in
Appendix A.1.
3If S is a closed set, and S denotes its closure, the topological frontier S˜ of S is defined as S\S.
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Theorem 2.6. Suppose that (k, θ)≫ 0. Let s : Xˆ ×Θn → X be an optimal consumption
profile for (PP), as a function of aggregate consumption xˆ and the Pareto weights θ, such
that 0 < xˆ ≤ f(k) − y, for some y ∈ Γ(k)\{0}, and xˆ :=
∑
i s
i(xˆ, θ). Let F : Θn → Θn
be a transition map for the Pareto weights associated to the optimal choice of τ in (PP).
Then, there exists an aggregate periodic utility function U : Xˆ×Θn → R, defined as
(2.2) U(xˆ, θ) :=
n∑
i=1
θiui
(
si(xˆ, θ)
)
,
and an aggregate discount rate µ : Θn → R+, given by
(2.3) µ(θ) :=
n∑
i=1
θiδi,
such that the value of (PP) satisfies the following functional equation
(2.4) V (k, θ) = sup
y∈Γ(k)
[
U(f(k)− y, θ) + µ(θ)V (y, F (θ))
]
,
for all (k, θ) in the interior of K ×Θn.
A collective periodic utility function U(xˆt, θt) is constructed by aggregating individual
indirect utility functions, which in turn are the values of the following auxiliary program
to (PP),
sup
x∈X
{∑
i θ
i ui(x
i) :
∑
i x
i ≤ xˆ
}
,(PPx)
where xˆ satisfies all the hypotheses of Theorem 2.6. This is derived from a standard
result, Fisher’s separation theorem, which implies that an optimal consumption profile in
(PP) can be obtained separately from the investment decision, i.e., the choice of y. A key
assumption for the separation result to hold in this case is the additivity of intertemporal
preferences.
After solving (PPx), it is easy to see that aggregate intertemporal preferences have
a recursive representation. For concreteness, let λ and µ be the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the inequality restrictions in (PP), and consider the first-order conditions
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of this problem.4 The conditions with respect to θit+1 and z
i
t+1, respectively, imply that
zit = ui(x
i
t) + δ
izit+1, t = 0, 1, . . . ,(2.5)
θitδ
i = µtθ
i
t+1, t = 0, 1, . . . .(2.6)
Combining (2.5) with (2.6) yields
θitz
i
t = θ
i
tui(x
i
t) + µtθ
i
t+1z
i
t+1, t = 0, 1, . . . .
Therefore, adding up both sides of the equality over i ∈ N in the expression above,
Wt = U(xˆt, θt) + µ(θt)Wt+1, t = 0, 1, . . . ,(2.7)
where Wt :=
∑
i θ
i
tw
i
t is an aggregate utility index, U(xˆt, θt) is the value of (PPx), and
µ(θt), which is defined by (2.3), is obtained from adding both sides of (2.6) over i ∈ N .
Now it is apparent that, taken as a function of θt, this multiplier can be interpreted
as an aggregate factor of time preference and is related to the one-period discount rate.5
In fact, it is clear from (2.3), that this aggregate factor of time preference is the weighted
arithmetic mean of individual discount factors, with weights given by θt ∈ Θ
n. Moreover,
the evolution of µ(θt) over time is entirely explained by the evolution of the utility weights.
Therefore, (2.7) defines recursively an intertemporal utility function that assigns to each
infinite stream of aggregate consumption and Pareto weights (xˆ, θ) in ℓ+×(Θ
n)∞ an utility
measure for the collective formed by the members of N . This representation of collective
preferences also defines an aggregate discount factor
βt :=
t−1∏
s=0
µ(θs), t = 0, 1, . . .
It may seem odd to have preferences that depend, directly or indirectly, on a vector
of utility weights θt. Lucas and Stokey (1984) give Lagrange multipliers λ and µ an inter-
pretation of competitive equilibrium prices as functions of the state of the system (k, θ).
Let r(k, θ) be the price of the consumption good in the following period in terms of the
4The first-order conditions for an interior optimum are obtained by partial differentiation are
0 = θitu
′
i(x
i
t)− λt, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
0 = θitδ
i − µtθ
i
t+1, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
0 = zit − Vθi(kt+1, θt+1), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
0 = −λt + µtVk(kt+1, θt+1), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
together with transversality conditions for the state variables.
5The instantaneous rate of time preference is defined as ρ(·) := 1/µ(·) − 1.
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current consumption good. In a stationary equilibrium, µ is considered an equilibrium
interest factor which satisfies µ = 1/(1 + r). Unfortunately, this interpretation relies on
the assumption of increasing marginal impatience, which has been criticized on empirical
and theoretical grounds. In the current setup, taking µ as a subjective aggregate discount
rate implies decreasing marginal impatience, as will be shown in Section 4.
Alternatively, the recursive representation (2.7) can be rationalized using the concept of
variational utility introduced by Geoffard (1996). The variational utility of a consumption
path is defined as the minimum value of an additive criterion, taken over all possible
future discount rates. Note the close relation between this idea and the formulation of
the Pareto problem given in (A.3) and the auxiliary program (A.6). Variational utilities
include time additive and recursive preferences as special cases. Henceforth, the model
developed in this paper can be understood in the context of a broader class of deterministic
models where optimal allocations can be characterized as the solution of a simple dynamic
programming problem. The value function represents aggregate utility and belongs to the
class of variational utilities. A stochastic formulation of this approach can be found in
Dumas et al. (2000).
From (2.3) and (2.6), the dynamics of utility weights are determined by the following
updating process
θit+1 =
θitδ
i∑
j θ
j
t δ
j
, i = 1, . . . , n; t = 0, 1, . . . ,(2.8)
which defines the transition map F . This is [...]
Note that the updating process for the utility weights defined by (2.8) is quite relentless:
if θit = 0 for some i at any period t, then it will take a zero value forever, and agent i
is practically removed from the group. In this paper, this possibility is ruled out in
equilibrium by assumptions (U2) and (T2), as long as θi0 > 0 for all i ∈ N . Another
consequence of the dynamics implied by (2.8) is that for any j = 2, . . . , n, it follows that
θjt+1
θ1t+1
=
(
δj
δ1
)
θjt
θ1t
→ 0, as t→ +∞,
so the relative weight on aggregate utility vanishes asymptotically for all agents, with the
exception of the most patient. This and (2.1) immediately imply that θjt → 0
+, for all
j = 2, . . . , n, and θ1t → 1
− as t approaches infinity. Hence agent 1’s consumption equals
xt, while the others consume zero (or a minimum subsistence level), a result known as
Ramsey’s conjecture. But the analysis focuses on the case where θit > 0 holds for every
i ∈ N and for any finite t, so if the equilibrium implied by Ramsey’s conjecture holds, it
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may hold only asymptotically.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that (PP) admits a sequential formu-
lation with aggregate recursive preferences, which will be called the recursive preference
formulation (RPF), and has the form
sup
xˆ∈Ψ(k0),k∈Π(k0)
∞∑
t=0
βt U(xˆt, θt)(RPF)
s.t. xˆt + kt+1 ≤ f(kt), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
βt+1 ≤ µ(θt)βt, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
θt+1 = F (θt), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
k0, θ0 > 0 given, β0 = 1.
Furthermore, the value function V associated with (RPF) satisfies a generalized Bell-
man equation given by (2.4).
3 Collective Preferences
This section develops sufficient conditions under which the optimal allocations can be
written as a function of the state of the system (xˆt, θt), and the collective utility function
U(xˆt, θt) is multiplicatively separable (up to an additive constant). This is explained in
part by the fact that the literature on dynamic choice generally assumes a preference
relation %t over dated commodities (xˆ, t) that can be represented by a separable function,
e.g., where the discount factor, say D(t), depends on time, and instantaneous utility U(xˆ)
is a function of current consumption.
In order to characterize optimal intertemporal allocations, it is useful to define an index
of tolerance for consumption fluctuations (TCF) given by α := −u′/u′′, which has been
introduced by Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005). Using a specific form for the instantaneous
utility function u, that yields a TCF index as an affine function of consumption, allows to
obtain the desired separability for U . This is hardly surprising, given the analogous relation
between the concavity of the instantaneous utility function and risk tolerance/TCF.
3.1 Separability
Time additivity, as shown in the proof of Theorem 2.6, has an important consequence,
namely that the allocation of aggregate consumption among agents can be solved inde-
pendently from the collective investment decision. Hence, the distributive problem can be
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treated as an intratemporal or static program. This is key to obtain the separable form
for U .
Fix t ≥ 0 together with a feasible level of aggregate consumption xˆt > 0. Given θ0 > 0,
the vector of utility weights is determined by the formula θt = F
t(θ0), where F
t is the
t-fold application of the map F described in (2.8). Then, the collective instantaneous
utility function U : Xˆ×Θn → R is the value of the following program
sup
xt∈X
n∑
i=1
θitui(x
i
t)(S)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xit ≤ xˆt.
Definition 3.1. A sharing rule is a map s : Xˆ× Θn → Rn+ that satifies
(3.1)
n∑
i=1
si(xˆt, θt) = xˆt.
A Pareto optimal sharing rule is a sharing rule that solves (S).
The set S of all sharing rules s is nonempty, since the allocation si = xˆt/n for all i ∈ N
is always feasible. Note that there is a correspondence between this sharing rule and the
one defined in (A.4), given by si(xˆ, θ) = σi(θi, λ(xˆ, θ)). The following result characterizes
aggregate instantaneous utility and the optimal sharing rule.
Proposition 3.2. The aggregate instantaneous utility function U : Xˆ× Θn → R and the
Pareto optimal sharing rule s : Xˆ× Θn → Rn+ satisfy the following properties:
(a) For each θ ∈ Θn, U(·, θ) : Xˆ → R is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(b) For each xˆ ∈ Xˆ, U(xˆ, ·) : Θn → R is homogeneous of degree one and strictly convex;
(c) U is twice continuously differentiable in the interior of Xˆ× Θn;
(d) For each i ∈ N : si(0, θ) = 0, for all θ ∈ Θn; and si(xˆ, ·) : Θn → Rn+ is homogeneous
of degree zero, for all xˆ ∈ Xˆ;
(e) s is continuously differentiable in the interior of Xˆ×Θn.
The definitions of individual and aggregate indices of TFC are given next.
Definition 3.3. The individual index of TCF for agent i ∈ N is a map αi : Xˆ×Θn → R+
defined by
αi(xˆt, θt) := −
u′i(s
i(xˆt, θt))
u′′i (s
i(xˆt, θt))
.
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The collective index of TCF, α : Xˆ×Θn → R+ is defined in terms of U(xˆt, θt) as
α(xˆt, θt) := −
∂U(xˆt, θt)
∂xˆ
[
∂U2(xˆt, θt)
∂xˆ2
]−1
.
A simple characterization of individual and collective indices of TCF is given next. A
similar result is obtained in Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005), when xˆt follows an exogenous
process. Note that the result is independent of functional forms.
Proposition 3.4. Assume that s ∈ S is an optimal sharing rule. Then, for each i ∈ N
and for all (xˆt, θt) ∈ Xˆ×Θ
n, individual and aggregate indices of TCF satisfy the following
properties
αi(xˆt, θt) =
∂si(xˆt, θt)
∂xˆ

 n∑
j=1
αj(xˆt, θt)

 , and α(xˆt, θt) = n∑
i=1
αi(xˆt, θt).
Proof. See Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) and Wilson (1968).
In order to obtain the desired separability property for U , some additional results
are borrowed from works on optimal risk sharing and syndicate theory. In particular,
Amershi and Stoeckenius (1983) established a sufficient condition for aggregation that
requires separability, based on initial findings by Wilson (1968). The condition is related
to a class of utility functions representing individual preferences that yield affine sharing
rules.6 The same class of utility functions satisfies an analogous property in terms of TCF.
Definition 3.5. A periodic utility function u : R+→ R satisfies the property of affine
tolerance for consumption fluctuations (ATCF) if it has the form
u(x) =


γ
1−γ
[(
φ+ ηγ x
)1−γ
− 1
]
, 0 < γ < +∞, γ 6= 1,
log(φ+ η x), γ = 1,
(3.2)
with φ+(η/γ)x ≥ 0, 0 < η < +∞, and φ ∈ R. This family of parametric utility functions
will be referred to as the ATCF class.
Note that the ATCF class includes utility functions that are commonly used in the
literature. For instance, φ = 0 and η = 1 yields the power utility function. As γ → 1, it
6In an environment with risk averse agents, interpreting θ ∈ Θn as the realization of some random
variable with a known distribution, if individual utility functions belong to the hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) class with identical cautiousness, optimal sharing rules are affine functions.
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converges to the logarithmic form u(x) = log (φ+ η x), with φ+η x > 0. For φ = 1, taking
the limit γ → +∞ yields the exponential form u(x) = 1− exp(−η x). Note that if φ < 0,
consumption has a lower bound, i.e., x ≥ −φγ/η, then u takes the form of Stone-Geary
preferences. The case φ ≥ 0 is compatible with x ≥ 0.
Suppose that each individual utility belongs to the ATFC class. In order to obtain
exact aggregation, which allows for analytical results, the following particular form of an
individual utility function is adopted
(3.3) ui(x
i
t) :=
γ
1− γ
[(
φi +
η
γ
xit
)1−γ
− 1
]
,
with φi ∈ R for each i ∈ N . Exact aggregation mainly depends on the assumption that
γi = γ, for all i ∈ N . Adding heterogeneity through the parameter η does not affect the
results, but complicates the calculations in a substantive manner. For the remaining of this
section, the ATFC class for individual utilities is always assumed to have the form given
in (3.3). The following result characterizes optimal sharing rules under ATCF preferences.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that each agent has an instantaneous utility function ui that
belongs to the ATCF class. Further assume (k0, θ0) ≫ 0 and that the solution to (S) is
interior for every t. Then, the optimal sharing rule for each agent i ∈ N has the form
si(xˆt, θt) = a
i(θt) xˆt + b
i(θt),(3.4)
where ai(θt) ≥ 0,
∑
i a
i(θt) = 1, and
∑
i b
i(θt) = 0, for all θt ∈ Θ
n.
Proof. For each i and for each t, the optimal sharing rule is given by
σi(θit, λt) =
γ
η
[(
ηθit
λt
) 1
γ
− φi
]
.
Adding up over i yields aggregate consumption xˆt in terms of (θt, λt),
xˆt =
n∑
i=1
σi(θit, λt) =
γ
η
[(
η
λt
) 1
γ
n∑
i=1
(θit)
1
γ − φˆ
]
,
where φˆ :=
∑n
i=1 φ
i. Rearranging terms in the above expression,
λt =
(
n∑
i=1
(θit)
1
γ
)γ
η
(
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆt
)−γ
,
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and after appropriate substitutions,
si(xˆt, θt) =

 (θit) 1γ∑
j(θ
j
t )
1
γ

 xˆt + γφˆ
η

 (θit) 1γ∑
j(θ
j
t )
1
γ
−
φi
φˆ

 ,
hence the sharing rule is an affine function of xˆt, with coefficients given by
ai(θt) =
(θit)
1
γ∑
j(θ
j
t )
1
γ
and bi(θt) =
γφˆ
η

 (θit) 1γ∑
j(θ
j
t )
1
γ
−
φi
φˆ

 ,(3.5)
as claimed.
Motivated by the characterization given in Proposition 3.6, certain efficiency and fair-
ness criteria implied by the optimal sharing rule can be identified. Let θ˜it denote the
effective Pareto weight for agent i, defined as
θ˜it :=
(θit)
1
γ∑
j(θ
j
t )
1
γ
, t = 0, 1, . . . ,(3.6)
and note that 0 ≤ θ˜it ≤ 1 and
∑
i θ˜
i
t = 1. In other words, θ˜t :=
(
θ˜1t , . . . , θ˜
n
t
)
∈ Θn. Since the
optimal sharing rule given in (3.4) is homogeneous of degree zero, it can be alternatively
written as
si(xˆt, θ˜t) = θ˜
i
t xˆt +
γφˆ
η
(
θ˜it − φ˜
i
)
, i = 1, . . . , n; t = 0, 1, . . . ,(3.7)
where φ˜i := φi/φˆ. The first term on the right-hand side of (3.7) implies that each agent i
receives a proportion θ˜it of aggregate consumption, which can be interpreted as an efficiency
criterion. The second term is proportional to the difference between the corresponding
effective weight θ˜i and the individual parameter φ˜i, establishing a fairness criterion.
It is clear from (3.7) that the optimal sharing rule si allocates aggregate consumption
according to the effective weights and a system of transfers between agents. This transfer
scheme is purely redistributive, since aggregate transfers add up to zero. Loosely speaking,
si shows an implicit individual “preference for income redistribution” determined by φ˜i.
For simplicity, assume that φi = φ for all i ∈ N . To rule out uninteresting cases, also
assume that θ˜it 6= φ˜
i = (1/n) holds for at least one i ∈ N . Three distinct cases emerge:
(i) If φ = 0, then si implies a neutral preference for income redistribution. This is the
case when u is a power function or has the log form.
(ii) If φ < 0, then si implies a preference for top-to-bottom income redistribution. The set
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of agents N is partitioned into a subset D ⊂ N of agents in a relative disadvantaged
situation,
D :=
{
j ∈ N :
(
θ˜jt −
1
n
)
< 0
}
,
who receive a transfer from those in a position of relative advantage grouped in a
subset A ⊂ N ,
A :=
{
l ∈ N :
(
θ˜lt −
1
n
)
≥ 0
}
.
Naturally, the sets D and A are disjoint and N = D ∪A.
(iii) If φ > 0, then si implies a preference for bottom-to-top income redistribution, so this
case is opposite to the previous case.
Simple substitution shows that the collective instantaneous utility function, when in-
dividual utilities belong to the ATCF class, has the form
(3.8) U(xˆt, θt) =
γ
1− γ
[(∑
i
(θit)
1
γ
)γ (
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆt
)1−γ
− 1
]
,
which is clearly separable in xt and θt (up to an additive constant). Note also that the
aggregate TCF index is independent of θt and each individual TCF index is separable in
(xˆt, θt), that is,
αˆ(xˆt, θt) =
φˆ
η
+
1
γ
xˆt and α
i(xˆt, θt) = a
i(θt) αˆ(xˆt),
where ai(θt) is defined in (3.5). Moreover, ∂s
i/∂xˆ = ai(θt), for all i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ
n. It
is then verified that both U and s satisfy the properties of Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
3.2 Equivalence Results
This section presents several equivalent formulations of the Pareto problem (PP). For
this, some of the previous results require additional specifications. Let µ : Θn → [0, 1]
represent the aggregate discount rate defined as
µ(θt) :=
n∑
i=1
θitδ
i, t = 0, 1, . . .(3.9)
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Note that this function takes values on [δn, δ1] ⊂ [0, 1] for all θt ∈ Θ
n, it is strictly
increasing in each argument, and homogeneous of degree one.
Since µ is bounded on Θn, it is clear that the sequence of discount factors {βt}
∞
t=0 is
bounded on the space (0, 1)∞. This, together with (2.8), implies that the program (RPF)
is well-behaved, in a sense that will become clear below, and it satisfies a generalized
Bellman equation.7 For xˆt > 0 and θt in the interior of Θ
n, the Euler equation associated
with (RPF) is given by
∂U(xˆt, θt)
∂xˆ
= µ(θt)
∂U(xˆt+1, θt+1)
∂xˆ
f ′(kt+1),(3.10)
and assuming ATCF preferences, it follows from (3.8) and (3.9) that
(∑
i(θ
i
t)
1
γ
)γ (
φˆ+ ηγ xˆt
)−γ
=
(∑
i θ
i
tδ
i
) (∑
i(θ
i
t+1)
1
γ
)γ (
φˆ+ ηγ xˆt+1
)−γ
f ′(kt+1).(3.11)
Given that condition (3.10) is necessary and sufficient for optimality, it is possible to
define an aggregate utility function Uˆ , which is independent of θt, and an effective discount
rate µˆ satisfying an equivalent condition, i.e.,
U˜ ′(xˆt) = µ˜(θt)U˜
′(xˆt+1)f
′(kt+1).(3.12)
It is apparent from (3.11) that U˜ belongs to the ATCF class, as can be seen by substituting
φi for φˆ and xit for xˆt in (3.2). Therefore,
(3.13) U˜(xˆt) =
γ
1− γ
[(
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆt
)1−γ
− 1
]
.
Collecting the terms that depend on θt and θt+1 in (3.11) and using (2.8), the effective
aggregate discount rate µ˜(θ) is defined as
µ˜(θt) :=
[∑
i(θ
i
tδ
i)
1
γ∑
i(θ
i
t)
1
γ
]γ
=
[∑
i a
i(θit) (δ
i)
1
γ
]γ
.(3.14)
As µ is a weighted arithmetic mean, the effective discount rate µ˜ is a weighted generalized
mean (or weighted power mean) of the individual discount factors with weights ai(θit), for
each i ∈ N , and exponent γ. Only if individual preferences ui are logarithmic, µ and µ˜
coincide.
7The existence of a solution to functional equations arising in dynamic programming with gener-
alized discounting has been shown under fairly general conditions by Bhakta and Mitra (1984) and
Bhakta and Choudhury (1988) for the case of bounded returns, and by Jas´kiewicz et al. (2014) for un-
bounded returns.
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Hence there is a dynamic program equivalent to (RPF). Since U˜ is differentiable, the
solution satisfies an Euler equation equivalent to (3.11), which is given by (3.12). By
Theorem 2.6, the equivalent program also satisfies (2.4). These results are summarized in
the next proposition.
Proposition 3.7. Assume that preferences are ATCF. Then, the following program is
equivalent to (RPF)
sup
xˆ∈Ψ(k0),k∈Π(k0)
∞∑
t=0
β˜t U˜(xˆt)(RPF’)
s.t. xˆt + kt+1 ≤ f(kt), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
β˜t+1 ≤ µ˜(θt)β˜t, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
θt+1 = F (θt), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
k0, θ0 > 0 given, βˆ0 = 1.
Moreover, (RPF’) satisfies the following Bellman equation for each (k, θ) ∈ K×Θn,
V˜ (k, θ) = sup
y∈Γ(k)
[
U˜(f(k)− y) + µ˜(θ) V˜ (y, F (θ))
]
,
where U˜ and µ˜ are given by (3.13) and (3.14), respectively.
The last step to obtain separable preferences from (RPF’) is completed as follows. It
is clear from (2.8) that θt can be explicitly solved as a function of t and, in turn, the
aggregate discount rate µt will depend on t directly and not through θt. This leads to a
nonstationary dynamic programming problem, an approach that has been recently studied
by Kamihigashi (2008), and it involves an aggregate utility function U : Xˆ× Z+ → R and
a value function V : K × Z+ → R that depend directly on time.
Given the initial weights θ0 ∈ Θ
n, solving recursively for θit in (2.8) yields
θit =
θi0(δ
i)t∑
j θ
j
0(δ
j)t
, t = 0, 1, . . . ,(3.15)
which immediately implies
µt =
∑
i θ
i
0(δ
i)t+1∑
i θ
i
0(δ
i)t
, t = 0, 1, . . . .(3.16)
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Next, set β0 = 1 so each member of the sequence {βt}
∞
t=0 is given by
βt =
t−1∏
s=0
µs =
n∑
i=1
θi0(δ
i)t, for all t ≥ 1.(3.17)
Now suppose that θi0 > 0 for each i ∈ N . The following nonstationary formulation
(NSF) of the Pareto problem is equivalent to (RPF) and has the form
sup
xˆ∈Ψ(k0),k∈Π(k0)
lim inf
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βt Ut (xˆt)(NSF)
s.t. xˆt + kt+1 ≤ f(kt), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
k0 > 0 given.
In addition, the value function Vt associated to (NSF) satisfies the (modified) Bellman
equation
Vt(kt) = sup
kt+1∈Γˆ(kt)
[
Ut(f(kt)− kt+1) + βt+1Vt+1(kt+1)
]
,
where βt is given by (3.17) for each t, and Γˆ(kt) is defined as
(3.18) Γˆ(kt) :=
{
kt+1 ∈ Γ(kt) : Ut(f(kt)− kt+1) > −∞
}
.
This result is a straightforward application of Theorem 1 in Kamihigashi (2008).8
Note that the previous formulation does not assume specific functional forms. Under
ATCF preferences, collective instantaneous utility for the NSF is obtained substituting
(3.15) and (3.16) into (3.8), which yields
Ut(xˆ) =
γ
1− γ


(∑
i(θ
i
0(δ
i)t)
1
γ
)γ
∑
i θ
i
0(δ
i)t
(
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆ
)1−γ
− 1

 .
This function satisfies the following asymptotic properties that considerably simplify the
formulation of the nonstationary program,
U0(xˆ) := lim
t→0+
Ut(xˆ) =
γ
1− γ
[(∑
i(θ
i
0)
1
γ
)γ (
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆ
)1−γ
− 1
]
, for all xˆ ∈ Xˆ,
8It can be shown that a Bellman equation holds in a strict sense iff there is no kt+1 ∈ Γ(kt) such that
Ut(f(kt)− kt+1) = −∞ and Vt+1(kt+1) = +∞ simultaneously. See (Kamihigashi, 2008, Theorem 2).
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and
lim
t→+∞
Ut(xˆ) =
γ
1− γ
[(
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆ
)1−γ
− 1
]
= U(xˆ), for all xˆ ∈ Xˆ.
Moreover, the sequence {Ut(xˆ)}
∞
t=0 is strictly decreasing if 0 < γ ≤ 1 (resp. strictly
increasing if 1 < γ < +∞) for any xˆ ∈ Xˆ, and takes values on the closed interval
[U(xˆ), U0(xˆ)] (resp. [U0(xˆ), U(xˆ)]).
Recall that θ˜0 ∈ Θ
n denotes the vector of effective initial Pareto weights, which is
obtained from (3.6) for t = 0,
θ˜i0 =
(θi0)
1
γ∑
j(θ
j
0)
1
γ
, i = 1, . . . , n.
For ease of notation, define the effective individual discount factor as δ˜i := (δi)1/γ , i ∈ N ,
so the effective discount factor β˜t associated with (NSF) is given by
β˜t =
(
n∑
i=1
θ˜i0(δ˜
i)t
)γ
, t = 0, 1, . . .(3.19)
In a similar way as in the previous case, the Euler equation associated with (NSF) is
equivalent to (3.11) with instantaneous utility U˜(xˆ) and effective discount factor β˜t,
β˜t U˜
′(xˆt) = β˜t+1 U˜
′(xˆt+1)f
′(kt+1),
therefore(
n∑
i=1
θ˜i0(δ˜
i)t
)γ (
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆt
)−γ
=
(
n∑
i=1
θ˜i0(δ˜
i)t+1
)γ (
φˆ+
η
γ
xˆt+1
)−γ
f ′(kt+1).
The next proposition, analogous to Proposition 3.7, summarizes the results for the NSF.
Proposition 3.8. Assume that preferences are ATCF. Then, there exists an equivalent
program to (NSF) which has the form
sup
xˆ∈Ψ(k0),k∈Π(k0)
∞∑
t=0
β˜t U˜(xˆt)(NSF’)
s.t. xˆt + kt+1 ≤ f(kt), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
k0 > 0 given,
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and satisfies the (modified) Bellman equation
V˜t(kt) = sup
kt+1∈Γˆ(kt)
[
U˜(f(kt)− kt+1) + β˜t+1 V˜t+1(kt+1)
]
, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where Γˆ has been defined in (3.18) and β˜t is given by (3.19), for all t.
Having completed the construction of collective preferences of the sought form for U ,
the following section offers a characterization of these preferences.
4 Discussion
Several properties of collective intertemporal utility functions are discussed in this section.
First, preferences are characterized in terms of impatience. In particular, it is shown
that they satisfy decreasing marginal impatience. Next, the properties of stationarity,
time invariance, and time consistency –introduced in Section 1– will be verified for these
collective preferences. To conclude, a comparison of the model developed in the previous
section is made with a formulation of the Pareto problem under constant utility weights
and an endogenous consumption-saving decision.
4.1 Collective impatience
Definition 4.1. Given an aggregate instantaneous utility function U(xˆt, θt) and a dis-
count factor βt, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution between present and future
aggregate consumption, xˆt and xˆt+1, is defined as
M[(xˆt, xˆt+1); (θt, θt+1)] := βt
∂U(xˆt, θt)
∂xˆ
[
βt+1
∂U(xˆt+1, θt+1)
∂xˆ
]−1
.
Impatience is typically measured as the pure rate of time preference ρˆt, which in turn
is defined as the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution when xˆt = xˆt+1 = xˆ, for some
xˆ ∈ Xˆ. If the function U belongs to the ATCF class, as in (3.8), it follows that
(1 + ρˆt) :=
(∑
i(θ
i
t)
1
γ
)γ (
φˆ+ ηγ xˆ
)−γ
(∑
i δ
iθit
) (∑
i(θ
i
t+1)
1
γ
)γ (
φˆ+ ηγ xˆ
)−γ =
[ ∑
i(θ
i
t)
1
γ∑
i(θ
i
tδ
i)
1
γ
]γ
,
and the discount rate implied by this expression is exactly ρ˜t = 1/µ˜(θt) − 1, where µ˜(·)
is given by (3.14). But this yields the same effective discount factor as in (3.19). Then,
the above expression offers an alternative way to obtain the effective aggregate discount
factor which is independent of the optimization process.
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The following lemma is needed for future reference, but it is also an interesting result
on its own, since it characterizes the behavior of aggregate discount factors as a function
of time.
Lemma 4.2. Assume that βt is defined as in (3.17) for all t. Then, for every 0 ≤ t ≤ t
′
and 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ ′,9
βt+τ
βt+τ ′
−
βt′+τ
βt′+τ ′
≥ 0,
with strict inequality if t < t′ and τ < τ ′.
Given that βt is decreasing in t, there is impatience at the aggregate level. In ad-
dition, Lemma 4.2 establishes that collective preferences, as constructed in the previous
section, satisfy the property of diminishing marginal impatience, in a sense consistent with
a discrete-time formulation.
4.2 Stationarity, time invariance, and time consistency
In terms of the three axioms introduced by Halevy (2015), it is shown below that the
dynamic choice model developed in Section 3 yields collective preferences that are both
nonstationary and time-dependent. At the same time, and perhaps surprisingly, these
preferences satisfy time consistency.
Before presenting the main result of this section, note that discount factors βt (or,
equivalently, β˜t) transform period t values into period 0 units. Given the multiplicative
nature of discount factors derived from recursive preferences, it is easy to see that for any
t, τ ≥ 0, discounting from (t+ τ) to t is equivalent to multiplication by the factor βt+τ/βt.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that a sequence of collective preference relations over (xˆ, t) is
represented by a separable utility function of the form β˜t U˜(xˆ), where U˜ and β˜t are given
by (3.13) and (3.19), respectively. Furthermore, assume θi0 > 0 for each i ∈ N . Then,
collective time preferences satisfy:
¬ (H1) nonstationarity,
¬ (H2) time dependency,
(H3) time consistency.
Proof. First, note that the conclusion of Lemma 4.2 remains valid if βt is replaced by β˜t.
The reason is because substituting θi0 with θ˜
i
0 and δ
i with δ˜i in the definition of βt yields
9This can be assumed without loss of generality, given that it is always possible to relabel t, t′ and τ, τ ′
in order to satisfy the required inequalities.
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∑
i θ˜
i
0(δ˜
i)t. It is easy to see from (3.19) that β˜t is an order-preserving transformation of
βt with respect to t. Then, the Lemma also holds for this monotonic transformation.
Now assume that b, c ∈ Xˆ, 0 ≤ t < t′ and 0 ≤ τ < τ ′. From (H1), one of the
indifference conditions for stationarity (on the left-hand side) implies that
(4.1)
β˜t+τ
β˜t
U˜(b) =
β˜t+τ ′
β˜t
U˜(c).
Hence, the following equality (on the right-hand side) must hold,
β˜t+τ
β˜t
β˜t′+τ
β˜t+τ
U˜(b) =
β˜t+τ ′
β˜t
β˜t′+τ ′
β˜t+τ ′
U˜(c),
which is equivalent to
(4.2)
β˜t+τ
β˜t+τ ′
−
β˜t′+τ
β˜t′+τ ′
= 0.
To verify (H2), suppose that (4.1) holds. Time invariance requires that, from the
perspective of t′ preferences, applying the same time delays (τ and τ ′) to each alternative
preserves indifference, that is,
(4.3)
β˜t′+τ
β˜′t
U˜(b) =
β˜t′+τ ′
β˜′t
U˜(c).
Combine (4.1) and (4.3) to obtain
β˜t+τ
β˜t′+τ
−
β˜t+τ ′
β˜t′+τ ′
=
β˜t+τ ′
β˜t′+τ
(
β˜t+τ
β˜t+τ ′
−
β˜t′+τ
β˜t′+τ ′
)
= 0,
which reduces to (4.2). In other words, the same condition must be satisfied for (H1) and
(H2) to hold. But Lemma 4.2 implies that if t < t′ and τ < τ ′, then
β˜t+τ
β˜t+τ ′
−
β˜t′+τ
β˜t′+τ ′
> 0,
which contradicts (4.2). This proves ¬(H1) and ¬(H2).
From (H3), time consistency implies that the following two conditions should be sat-
isfied simultaneously,
β˜t+τ
β˜t
U˜(b) =
β˜t+τ ′
β˜t
U˜(c) and
β˜t+τ
β˜t′
U˜(b) =
β˜t+τ ′
β˜t′
U˜(c).
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Since β˜t and β˜t′ are strictly positive by hypothesis, it immediately follows that collective
preferences are time consistent and the proof is complete.
Note that the proof of Theorem 4.3 captures an interesting aspect of the analysis
carried out by Halevy (2015). Given that any two properties imply the third, if one
property is satisfied, say, time consistency, and another one is not, e.g., stationarity, the
third property must not be satisfied. This is the reason why the conditions for stationarity
and time invariance are identical.
4.3 Heterogeneous discounting with constant Pareto weights
To close this section, the results obtained from the current framework will be compared
with those of Jackson and Yariv (2014, 2015) to offer some insights into their results and
evaluate possible extensions to this paper. The authors show that under heterogeneous
discounting, collective preferences that satisfy Pareto optimality must be either time incon-
sistent or dictatorial. But they assume constant utility weights and a common consumption
stream that is exogenous. Consequently, key instruments to resolve intertemporal conflicts
are missing.
For simplicity, suppose that u is bounded on R+. Let θ¯ ∈ Θ
n be a vector of constant
(time homogeneous) weights, and add to (PP) the restriction θit = θ
i
t+1 = θ¯
i, for all i and
for all t. Let J(·, θ¯) denote the corresponding value function. Then, the right-hand side of
(A.1) is replaced by
sup
(x,y,z,λ)∈Φ
inf
µ≥0
{∑
i θ¯
i
[
ui(x
i)− λ
∑
i x
i
]
+ λ[f(k)− y] +
∑
i θ¯
i
(
δi − µ
)
zi + µJ(y, θ¯)
}
.
Given that the choice of xˆ =
∑
i x
i can still be separated from the investment decision and
the resource restriction holds with equality, following similar arguments as in the proof of
Theorem 2.6, the above problem is reduced to
sup
z∈U
sup
y∈Γ(k)
inf
µ≥0
{
U(f(k)− y, θ¯) +
[∑
i θ¯
iδizi − µ
∑
i θ¯
izi
]
+ µJ(y, θ¯)
}
.(4.4)
By hypothesis, each zi must be chosen from some interval Zi := [0, zim] with z
i
m > 0.
Consider, for instance, an “egalitarian solution” to (4.4) in which zi = z > 0 and
z ∈
⋂
i Z
i for all i ∈ N . Hence, J(y, θ¯) = z. This implies that
J(k, θ¯) = sup
y∈Γ(k)
{
U(f(k)− y, θ¯) + δ¯J(y, θ¯)
}
,
where δ¯ := (
∑
i θ¯
iδi), so the aggregate discount factor is the weighted average of all
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individual discount factors. This formulation can be interpreted as the dynamic program
of a fictional “representative agent” with an average discount factor and time consistent
preferences. But these preferences will not satisfy unanimity, unless all the θ¯i are identical
(i.e., equal to (1/n) for each i).
Another possibility is to consider an “efficient solution” that consists in setting µ so
that θ¯i(δi−µ) = 0, the first-order condition from differentiating the objective with respect
to each zi. However, this condition may be satisfied only for a single i ∈ N . Which value
of δi should be chosen? Suppose that µ = δ1. It follows that zj = 0 for all j > 1, hence
the problem reduces to
J(k, θ¯) = sup
y∈Γ(k)
{
U(f(k)− y, θ¯) + δ1J(y, θ¯)
}
.(4.5)
But this is equivalent to finding the optimum for i = 1 and leaving the other agents with
zero utility, thus collective preferences will be dictatorial. Assume that µ = δi for some i
in N\{1}. In that case, zk = 0 for all k > i, then the problem has the form
sup
y∈Γ(k)
sup
(z1,...,zi)∈Z1×···×Zi
{
U(f(k)− y, θ¯) +
∑
j<i
θ¯j(δj − δi)zj + δiJ(y, θ¯)
}
.(4.6)
Note that the marginal contribution of each agent 1 ≤ j < i to the aggregate continuation
value is precisely θ¯j(δj − δi), hence the choice of (z1, . . . , zi) can be formulated as a linear
programming problem, i.e.,
(4.7) sup
(z1,...,zi)∈Z1×···×Zi
∑
j<i
θ¯j(δj − δi)zj .
If the solution lies on a vertex of the convex polytope that describes the feasible region,
at most two agents get nonzero utility. If it lies on an edge or a face of the polytope, two
or more agents obtain positive continuation utilities, but they are linear combinations of
each other. In any case, the solution of this auxiliary problem will be dictatorial. Let
zˇj ∈ Zj, 1 ≤ j < i, denote any solution to (4.7). Then, (4.6) reduces to
sup
y∈Γ(k)
[
U(f(k)− y, θ¯) + δiJ(y, θ¯)
]
+
∑
j<i
θ¯jδj zˇj ,(4.8)
so the choice of y at the margin is determined by δi, whereas each of the θ¯jδj zˇj terms
works effectively as a nonnegative utility transfer to those agents with a higher level of
patience than i.
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It is easy to show that at any period t, an optimal sharing rule x˜jt must satisfy
(
δi
δj
)t
=
θ¯ju′j(x˜
j
t )
θ¯iu′i(x˜
i
t)
, 1 ≤ j < i; t = 0, 1, . . .(4.9)
Hence as t→ +∞, the ratio of marginal utilities u′j(x˜
j
t )/u
′
i(x˜
i
t)→ 0, which implies that the
consumption of each agent j should grow faster than the consumption of i in equilibrium.
Note that (4.9) also implies
u′i(x˜
i
t)
δiu′i(x˜
i
t+1)
=
u′j(x˜
j
t )
δju′j(x˜
j
t+1)
, 1 ≤ j < i; t = 0, 1, . . .
At the same time, the evolution of aggregate variables is determined by the following Euler
equation
U˜ ′(xˆt) = δ
i U˜ ′(xˆt+1) f
′(y¯t), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where y¯t ∈ Γ(kt) solves (4.8), and the aggregate resource restriction is satisfied, then
xˆt =
∑
j<i
xˆjt + xˆ
i
t = f(kt)− y¯t, t = 0, 1, . . .
But a program with such characteristics is clearly time inconsistent.
To summarize, if the Pareto weights are restricted to be constant over time and the
consumption-savings choice is endogenous, an optimal solution that is interior for all agents
may be difficult (or even impossible) to achieve. In addition, the problems of time incon-
sistency and dictatorial preferences become interrelated and more complex in nature.
5 Concluding remarks
It is not surprising that some strong assumptions, especially time-additive preferences
and interior optimal sharing rules, are needed to obtain the main results of this paper.
Extending this framework to a broader class of intertemporal preferences is a natural
direction for future work. It is also easily verified that, even within the ATCF class of
utility functions, there exist conditions for which a null share for some agents may be
optimal in some periods. Relaxing the assumption of an interior sharing rule would give
rise to changes in the composition of the group over time and richer dynamics could occur.
In that case, the set of agents with a positive share would be included as a state variable
of the system. This seems to be a challenging but promising direction for future research.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.6
Fix k ∈ (0, km) and θ ∈ Θ
n with θi > 0, for all i ∈ N . Let λ and µ be nonnegative Lagrange
multipliers associated to the inequality restrictions in (PP), and form the Lagrangean
L (x, y, z, τ, λ, µ| k, θ) =
∑
i θ
i[ui(x
i) + δizi] + λ[f(k)−
∑
i x
i − y](A.1)
− µ[
∑
i τ
izi − V (y, τ)].
Denote by X ⊂ Rn+ the space of x allocations, and let Φ := X × R+× U × R+ and
Υ := Θn × R+. The proof is divided into several steps.
Step 1. Note that Proposition 2.4 implies that (PP) is a saddle-point problem with a
concave-convex objective function, defined on products of convex sets, that satisfies strong
duality.10 Hence
(A.2) V (k, θ) = sup
(x,y,z,λ)∈Φ
inf
(τ,µ)∈Υ
L (x, y, z, τ, λ, µ| k, θ),
and the sup and inf above can be interchanged. By Lemma 1 in Kamihigashi (2008), the
supremum over two variables can be split into two suprema. Then, the right-hand side of
(A.2) is equivalent to:
sup
x∈X
sup
(y,z,λ)∈Φx
inf
(τ,µ)∈Υ
{ [∑
i θ
iui(x
i) + λ(xˆ−
∑
i x
i)
]
+ λ[f(k)− xˆ− y](A.3)
+
∑
i(θ
iδi − µτ i)zi + µV (y, τ)
}
,
where Φx := {(y, z, λ) ∈ R+× U × R+ : (x, y, z, λ) ∈ Φ}.
Step 2. Consider the following auxiliary program
sup
x∈X
[∑
i θ
iui(x
i) + λ
(
xˆ−
∑
i x
i
)]
,
for some 0 < xˆ ≤ f(k) given. Since this problem is convex and differentiable, and the
solution is interior for each i, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and
sufficient for optimality. Then, for each i ∈ N there exists a map σi : [0, 1] × R+→ R+,
such that
θiu′i
(
σi(θi, λ)
)
= λ,(A.4)
10For a recent treatment on strong duality in convex optimization problems, see Bertsekas et al. (2003).
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and
∑
i σ
i(θi, λ) ≤ xˆ. The value of this auxiliary program is given by
(A.5) Q(λ, xˆ, θ) :=
∑
i θ
iui
(
σi(θi, λ)
)
+ λ
[
xˆ−
∑
i σ
i(θi, λ)
]
.
Next, replace supx∈X
[∑
i θ
iui(x
i) + λ(xˆ−
∑
i x
i)
]
with Q(λ, xˆ, θ) in (A.3), and split the
sup again, which implies that (A.3) is equivalent to
sup
z∈U
sup
(y,λ)∈Φx,z
inf
(τ,µ)∈Υ
{
Q(λ, xˆ, θ) + λ[f(k)−xˆ−y] +
[∑
i(θ
iδi − µτ i)zi
]
+ µV (y, τ)
}
,
where Φx,z := {(y, λ) ∈ R+× R+ : (y, z, λ) ∈ Φx}.
Step 3. Now, solve the following auxiliary program for 0 ≤ y < f(k) given,
(A.6) sup
z∈U
inf
(τ,µ)∈Υ
[∑
i(θ
iδi − µτ i)zi + µV (y, τ)
]
.
If µ = 0, then each i should get the sup of zi on U , but this is infeasible. Assume µ > 0,
which implies
∑
i τ
izi = V (y, τ) by complementary slackness. Differentiating the objective
in (A.6) with respect to τ i yields zi = ∂V/∂τ i, i = 1, . . . , n. On the other hand, given
that 0 < θi < 1, optimality requires that τ i satisfies
θiδi = µτ i,(A.7)
for each i ∈ N . This in turn implies 0 < τ i < 1 for all i, so adding up (A.7) over i yields
µ =
n∑
i=1
θiδi,
which is (2.3). Slightly abusing notation, call this map µ : Θn → R+. Since (A.7) defines
a transition map F : Θn → Θn for the utility weights, then τ = F (θ) at an optimum.
Taking all this into consideration, the right-hand side of (A.2) can be further simplified
and written as
sup
(y,λ)∈Φx,z
{Q(λ, xˆ, θ) + λ[f(k)− xˆ− y] + µ(θ)V (y, F (θ))} .(A.8)
Step 4. By (A.4), individual allocations depend only on (θ, λ), so an optimal choice of
x can be formulated in terms of aggregate consumption xˆ, instead of λ. Given that each
ui is strictly increasing and λ > 0 holds at the optimum, set xˆ =
∑
i σ
i(θi, λ) in (A.5)
and use this expression to implicitly define a function λ : Xˆ× Θn → R+. This, in turn,
allows to define an optimal consumption profile as a map s : Xˆ × Θn → X by setting
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si(xˆ, θ) := σi(θi, λ(xˆ, θ)). Given that the value of (A.5) becomes
Q(λ(xˆ, θ), xˆ, θ) =
n∑
i=1
θiui
(
σi(θi, λ(xˆ, θ))
)
,
it is possible to define a map U : Xˆ×Θn → R by substituting σi with si on the right-hand
side of the above expression and setting U(xˆ, θ) := Q(λ(xˆ, θ), xˆ, θ). This gives (2.2).
Step 5. Finally, substituting U(xˆ, θ) into (A.8) yields
V (k, θ) = sup
(xˆ,y)≫0
[
U(xˆ, θ) + µ(θ)V (y, F (θ)) : xˆ+ y ≤ f(k)
]
,
that is equivalent to (A.2). It is readily verified that U(xˆ, θ) is strictly increasing in xˆ
for all θ. To see this, implicitly differentiate σi with respect to λ in (A.4) to obtain
∂σi/∂λ = (θiu
′′
i (σ
i))−1 < 0, for each i. It also follows from implicit differentiation that
∂λ/∂xˆ =
∑
i ∂σ
i/∂λ < 0. Therefore,
∂U
∂xˆ
=
n∑
i=1
θiu′i(σ
i)
∂σi
∂λ
∂λ
∂xˆ
=
n∑
i=1
λ
∂σi
∂λ
∂λ
∂xˆ
> 0.
This, together with the strict monotonicity of V with respect to its first argument implies
that the resource restriction, xˆ ≤ f(k)− y, holds with equality, which gives (2.4).
Since (k, θ) was chosen arbitrarily in the interior of K× Θn, all the above results can
be extended to that set. This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proofs for parts (a), (c), and (e) are omitted. The interested reader is referred to the
extensive work of Mas-Colell (1989) for details. In order to simplify the proofs for the
remaining results, it will be assumed that the differentiability of U and s has already been
established.
Fix xˆ ∈ (0,+∞) and suppose that θi > 0 holds for all i ∈ N . Differentiating (3.1)
with respect to θi yields
n∑
j=1
∂sj(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
= 0.(A.9)
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Next, differentiate U(xˆ, θ) =
∑
i θ
iui(s
i(xˆ, θ)) with respect to θi, so that
∂U(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
= ui(s
i(xˆ, θ)) +
n∑
j=1
θju′j(s
j(xˆ, θ))
∂sj(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
= ui(s
i(xˆ, θ)) + λ(xˆ, θ)
n∑
j=1
∂sj(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
,
where the second equality uses the fact that θiu′i(s
i(xˆ, θ)) = λ(xˆ, θ), from the KKT opti-
mality conditions. By (A.9), the above equality reduces to
∂U(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
= ui(s
i(xˆ, θ)), for all i ∈ N,(A.10)
which in turn implies that
n∑
i=1
θi
∂U(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
=
n∑
i=1
θiui(s
i(xˆ, θ)) = U(xˆ, θ),
hence, for every xˆ ∈ Xˆ, the aggregate utility function U(xˆ, θ) is homogeneous of degree
one in θ ∈ Θn by Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions. This proves (b).
For part (d), since si is nonnegative for each i ∈ N , it is clear from (3.1) that xˆ = 0
must imply si(0, θ) = 0, for all θ ∈ Θn. To prove that si(·, θ) is homogeneous of degree zero,
by a corollary from Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions, it is straightforward to
show that if U(·, θ) is homogeneous of degree one, its partial derivatives are homogeneous
of degree zero. Differentiating (A.10) with respect to θj, j = 1, . . . , n, gives
∂
∂θj
[
∂U(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
]
= u′i(s
i(xˆ, θ))
∂si(xˆ, θ)
∂θj
,
hence
n∑
j=1
θj
∂
∂θj
[
∂U(xˆ, θ)
∂θi
]
=
λ(xˆ, θ)
θi

 n∑
j=1
θj
∂si(xˆ, θ)
∂θj

 = 0.
But λ(xˆ, θ) > 0 in any interior equilibrium and θi > 0 by hypothesis, so the sum in square
brackets in the second equality must vanish, yielding the desired result.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Let ∆t, ∆τ be nonnegative integers such that t′ = t+∆t and τ ′ = τ +∆τ . Then, the sign
of βt+τ/βt+τ ′ − βt′+τ/βt′+τ ′ is the same as
[
n∑
i=1
θi0(δ
i)t+τ
] n∑
j=1
θj0(δ
j)t+∆t+τ+∆τ

−
[
n∑
i=1
θi0(δ
i)t+τ+∆τ
] n∑
j=1
θj0(δ
j)t+∆t+τ

 .
After expanding both products in this expression, it is easy to see that all factors with
i = j cancel each other out. Collecting the remaining terms yields
n∑
i,j=1
i<j
[
θi0(δ
i)t+τ
] [
θj0(δ
j)t+τ
] [
(δi)∆t − (δj)∆t
] [
(δi)∆τ − (δj)∆τ
]
.
Note that if either ∆t or ∆τ is zero, the above sum vanishes. Otherwise, provided that
∆t > 0 and ∆τ > 0, it follows from hypothesis that δi − δj > 0 for at least one pair i, j
such that i > j. Hence the sum must be strictly positive. This completes the proof.
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